The President’s Message:
Please be sure to tell your friends, acquaintances, and family
about the Round Table. I am always amazed how surprised someone is that
our organization exists. Be sure to invite them to a meeting.
Gerridine La Rovere
May 10, 2017 Program
On Wednesday, May 10, 2017, the members of the CWRT will conduct a
discussion. The topic will be the Fascinating Facts About
President's Who Served in the Civil War.
April 12, 2017 Program:
 After
Chancellorsville, the initiative in the East had shifted to the
Confederates. The two
armies lay opposing each other across the Rappahannock River.
In early June, Lee directed his forces to move northwest from
their positions near Fredericksburg, thus beginning the invasion of the
North that was to end at Gettysburg.
Leading this movement would be the brigades of Confederate
cavalry commanded by General J.E.B. Stuart.
By June 8th
the Southern horsemen were positioned just south of the river and the
infantry corps of Longstreet and Ewell were at Culpeper.
Stuart had established his headquarters at Fleetwood, a mansion
house on a high ridge a half mile northeast of Brandy Station, a stop on
the Orange and Alexandria Railroad between Culpeper and the river.
So as to take advantage of the available grazing areas in the
vicinity and to guard the various fords, the camps of Stuart’s five
brigades were widely scattered on the night of June 8th.
Fitz Lee was ill, but his troops, under the command of Munford, were at
Oak Shade Church, 7½ miles northwest of Fleetwood.
Rooney Lee was near Welford’s Ford on the Hazel River, two miles
west of the Rappahannock.
Grumble Jones had his camp near St. James church, just off the
Beverly-Brandy Station Road.
Both Hampton and Robertson were in the area around Brandy
Station. The pickets at
Beverly were from Jones’ brigade, while those at Kelly’s were under
Robertson’s orders. Even
more dangerous than the scattering of his brigades, however, was the
location of the camp of Beckham’s four batteries of horse artillery.
They were in the woods on the Beverly Road between the ford and
St. James Church. Thus, the
artillery was closer to the river than any cavalry unit except the
pickets. Here, without
support, it could be easily overrun by any attacking force.
On June 9th
Stuart was to begin the march north by crossing the river.
The presence of the Confederate cavalry near the river had attracted the
attention of the Northern authorities.
General Halleck in Washington had decided this concentration was
merely a prelude to another of Stuart’s raids.
The new chief of the Army of the Potomac’s cavalry corps, General
Alfred Pleasonton, agreed with Halleck.
General Hooker was not convinced but, whatever its meaning, he
ordered Pleasonton to do something about it.
In his subsequent writings Pleasonton claimed that Hooker had
directed him to make a reconnaissance in force.
That this was absolutely untrue is proven by the actual order
written by Hooker on June 7th.
This read, “…you will divide your cavalry to carry into execution
the object in view, which is to disperse and destroy the rebel force
assembled in the vicinity of Culpeper and destroy its trains and
supplies of all descriptions to the best of your ability.”
To
carry out Hooker’s orders Pleasonton was given two brigades of infantry,
under Ames and
Russell, and five batteries of horse artillery.
The 1500 foot soldiers, added to his three divisions of cavalry
gave him a combined force of 10,981 men with which to contest Stuart’s
9,536. In accordance with
his instructions, Pleasonton divided his force into two columns.
The right wing, with which Pleasonton himself would travel, would
consist of Buford’s First Division and Ames infantry.
This force, approximately one-half of the combined total, would
cross the river at Beverly Ford at dawn on June 9th
and then would march to Brandy Station four and a half miles away.
At the same time, the left wing, consisting of Gregg’s Third
Division, Duffie’s Second Division, and Russell’s Infantry, was to cross
the Rappahannock at Kelley’s Ford, eight miles downstream from Beverly.
The cavalry portion of this column under the overall command of
Gregg would move past Paoli Mill to the crossroads at the Madden-Doggett
houses. There Gregg would
turn northwest on the direct road to Brandy Station to unite with
Buford. Together the two
divisions would then march to Culpeper and attack Stuart in his camps
about noon. Duffie,
with his small division, would march directly through Stevensburg toward
Culpeper to guard the Federal left flank.
Russell’s infantry, once across the river was to move toward
Beverly to connect with Ames in protecting the fords and the Union
supply line. It was a good
plan but it was based on a fatal flaw.
The Southern cavalry was not at Culpeper, but instead was further
north around Brandy Station, much nearer the river and at the exact
point where Buford and Gregg were to unite.
By 8:30 P.M. on June 8th,
Pleasonton had concentrated his entire force near Kelly’s Ford, having
marched the twenty miles from Warrenton since noon.
Rain had fallen that afternoon, soaking the dust on the roads and
thus helping to conceal the Federal movements.
The troops were allowed a few hours rest, and told to be ready to
move out at 3:00 A.M.
Promptly at that hour, Buford started toward Beverly Ford, leaving Gregg
to delay his advance so as to cross at Kelly’s as the First Division did
the same at the upper ford.
At 4:30 A.M., Buford’s lead brigade, commanded by Benjamin “Grimes”
Davis, crossed the river, surprising the Confederate pickets.
The few Southerners managed to fire several rounds, but Davis
easily pushed passed them to the north edge of a heavily wooded area.
The road from the ford ran through these trees, but was very
narrow and was bordered on either side by ditches.
Thus the Federals were compelled to remain in their column of
fours as they advanced, rather than being able to deploy in line of
battle. As Davis and his
troopers were entering the woods, they were met head-on by the Southern
reserve picket force.
Although heavily outnumbering the small group of Confederated, the
Federals, hampered by the lack of room to maneuver, pulled back, leaving
Davis alone in their front.
As the colonel turned to urge his troops forward, he was charged by a
lone Southern officer who shot Davis in the head, killing him instantly.
The death of their commander again caused the Federals to pause
momentarily.
The firing had, of course, awakened not only Beckham’s artillery, parked
in the southern edge of the woods, but also the remaining regiments of
Jones brigade camped in the fields around the church.
Beckham directed two of his guns to take position in the road,
while the remainder fled to the safety of the higher ground at the
church. Jones sent parts of
two regiments forward to delay the Federals while the rest of the
brigade attempted to establish a defense line.
The Southerners, many half-dressed and riding bareback, charged,
but were struck in turn by the reformed Federals.
The Confederates, outmanned and outflanked, were forced to pull
back out of the woods, the two artillery pieces following behind the
cavalry. Both units
rejoined Jones and Beckham near the church.
As the Federals continued to advance, Jones ordered his three
remaining regiments to charge and they struck the Northerners as the
latter emerged from the woods into the clearing north of the church.
However, the Confederates were again repulsed and they withdrew.
Each side now established a battle line, the Federals in the
trees along the north side of the clearing, Jones and Beckham on the
high ground near the church south of the clearing.
Back on Fleetwood Hill, Stuart received a dispatch from Jones describing
the Federal crossing and the situation.
Attempting to concentrate his brigades, Stuart sent orders to
Hampton, Rooney Lee, and Munford to bring their brigades to Jones’
support. In his message to
Hampton, he directed that one regiment be left in reserve at Brandy
Station. Hampton designated M.C. Butler’s 2nd
South Carolina to perform the task.
Stuart
sent his remaining brigade, Robertson’s, out the Brandy Station –
Kelly’s Ford Road to protect the Confederate right flank and strengthen
the guard over that vital river crossing.
As a precautionary measure, all of the headquarters equipment and
baggage were placed in wagons and sent south to Culpeper.
Stuart, himself, then rode to examine the line Jones had
selected.
Jones and the artillery were in the center facing generally north with
their backs to the railroad.
Hampton, coming up on the right, extended the line in a
southeasterly direction. However, it was the position taken by Rooney
Lee that was to prove the key to this part of the battlefield.
Advancing down the Hazel from Welford's and then cutting across
country, Rooney came on the scene in the area between the Cunningham and
Thompson farms. Here he
found a stone wall running northeasterly almost perpendicular to Jones.
Posting his dismounted troopers behind this wall and his own
artillery on a hill behind the Green house, Lee was an obvious threat to
the Federal right flank and rear.
Stuart was well satisfied with the dispositions that fate had
imposed upon him.
On the Federal side, Pleasonton had accomplished a surprise, but had
been surprised himself.
Instead of a quick march to Brandy Station hindered only by an
astonished picket force, Pleasonton and Buford had encountered heavy
resistance by both cavalry and artillery.
Rather than leaving Ames' infantry at the ford, Pleasonton
directed them into the center of his line at the edge of the woods, with
the cavalry posted on both flanks.
As soon as his line was established, the Federal commander,
recognizing the danger to his rear posed by Rooney Lee, ordered a
cavalry attack by his right.
Though gallantly made, the assault was beaten back.
Encouraged by this success, Jones, fighting dismounted and with
Hampton's aid, then engaged Ames in a series of charges and
countercharges over the open ground between them, but neither side was
able to gain an advantage.
During this period Pleasonton notified Hooker of the severe fighting.
Finally, just before noon, the Confederate pressure appeared to be
building and once more Rooney Lee's position on the Federal right flank
became a matter of grave concern.
The answer was to detract Southern attention from the offensive
to the defensive. To
accomplish this, a mounted charge was ordered, with its target the
artillery firing from the Green house hill.
Quickly covering the 800 yards between the opposing forces, two
Federal regiments reached the guns and passed through them.
Before they could solidify their position, however, they were
each hit on the flanks and, unsupported, were forced to retreat.
However, the tactic had worked.
Stuart's troopers paused and allowed the fighting at the church
to lull into intermittent skirmishing and artillery fire.
Meanwhile, things had also not gone as planned at Kelly's Ford.
Duffie, the lead division, got off to a late start and then took
the wrong road. As a result
of the delay, Gregg did not have his column across until almost 6:00.
He encountered little opposition and began moving southwest.
However passage of the river had not been unobserved.
Pickets from Jones brigade, posted upstream at the railroad
bridge had seen him and reported it to Stuart.
Also in the area were Beverly Robertson and his small two
regiment brigade, which were to specifically watch Kelly's Ford.
As Gregg crossed, Robertson sent couriers to Stuart with the
news. They never arrived,
but Stuart heard about Gregg from Jones' pickets.
The Confederate commander directed the regiment he was holding in
reserve, Butler's 2nd South Carolina, and also Wickham's 4th Virginia,
to move south to Stevensburg to cut off the Federal column should they
get past Robertson and march in that direction. Getting past Robertson
did not prove to be much of a problem.
Robertson took up a position astride the direct
road from Kelly's to Brandy Station.
From there he could see the Federals moving southwest directly
across his front toward Stevensburg.
Incredibly, he did absolutely nothing.
He did not attack the flank of Gregg's column nor did he send out
scouts to observe and report Gregg's progress.
Robertson simply spent the day blocking a road the Federals did
not plan to use and awaiting further orders from Stuart.
His brigade did not suffer a single casualty although it spent
twelve hours within hearing distance of the largest cavalry battle of
the Civil War. Gregg,
finally realizing that Robertson was nearby, left Russell's infantry to
guard the ford and prevent Robertson from following the Federal cavalry.
There were three roads that led from the Kelly's Ford—Stevensburg Road
to Brandy Station.
Robertson was blocking the one nearest the river. Butler was moving down
the road that leads to Stevensburg.
The third road, the Fredericksburg Road, was directly between the
other two. In the heat of
his fight with Buford, Stuart seems to have completely forgotten this
road for, at no time, were any Confederate troops posted on it.
This is the road Gregg had planned to take all along and he
reached it after a march of four miles.
Here Duffie continued on toward Stevensburg and Culpeper, while
Gregg and his own Third Division turned northwest to Brandy Station.
As he started, Gregg began to hear the guns of Buford's fight.
Soon he received a dispatch from Pleasonton advising him for the
first time of the battle at the church.
Gregg gave orders to his brigade commanders, Sir Percy Wyndham,
who was in the lead, and the impetuous Judson Kilpatrick to quicken the
pace. As Gregg and Wyndham
emerged from the trees south of the railroad tracks, they could hear
renewed firing in the direction of the church.
Realizing that the entire Confederate force must be at hand and
wanting his whole command under his direct control, Gregg paused to
dispatch an order to Duffie cancelling his previous instructions and
directing him to retrace his steps and close up on Kilpatrick's rear.
As the courier dashed away, Gregg turned his attention Fleetwood
Hill.
Earlier that morning, as Stuart left his headquarters atop the hill to
go to Jones' front, he ordered his aide, Major Henry McClellan, to
maintain a command post on the height.
Through the hours before noon McClellan had seen all of his
messengers sent to various parts of the fields until now, unbelievably,
he was all alone. As he
watched the Confederates begin to pick up the battle before the church
after its noontime lull, McClellan was approached by a Southern scout
who stated that a Federal column was approaching Brandy Station.
Not knowing the man, and not believing that such a force could
have bypassed Robertson, McClellan sent him back to verify his
information. Within five
minutes the scout returned, yelling at the major to look for himself.
As he did so, McClellan could see blue uniforms in the trees near
the station. Realizing the
importance of the hill, from which a force holding it could enfilade the
church line and block any retreat to Culpeper, the major cast about for
help, while sending the scout to warn Stuart.
At the base of the north slope of the hill sat one of Beckham's guns
under the command of Lt. R.W. Carter.
Its ammunition nearly exhausted, the gun and its crew had been
withdrawn from the battle at the church.
A desperate McClellan ordered Carter up to the top of Fleetwood
and directed him to open a slow, deliberate fire at the head of the
Federal column. Gregg,
already somewhat confused by the change in circumstances from that which
he had expected when he crossed the river, and ignorant of Buford's
exact position, stopped as Carter's shots began to fall slowly around
him. Believing that the
Confederates would not fire upon him, even with a single gun, unless
they held the hill in strength, Gregg directed Wyndham to pass through
Brandy Station cautiously and to unlimber his own artillery.
When the courier from McClellan gave Stuart the message of Federals in
his rear, he was incredulous.
He had been surprised once this day and now it had happened
again. Yet as the sound of
Carter's gun reached his ears and other witnesses arrived to relate the
scene at Fleetwood, the truth became undeniable.
Immediately, Stuart sent word to Hampton and Jones to return to
the hill. As Captain
Martin's three rifled guns of the 6th New York Artillery dueled with
Carter, Wyndham realized the true situation on top of the hill.
His brigade, with his own former regiment, the 1st New Jersey, in
the front, was ordered to charge up the south slope and take the crest.
McClellan, seeing that it was a race for the top, rushed down the
north slope to urge on the leading Confederate unit.
For the next hour and a half Fleetwood Hill and the neighboring
Barbour House Hill to the northwest would be the arena for fighting the
likes of which had never been seen before on the American continent, and
would never be seen again.
Charge and countercharge.
Mounted force against mounted force.
The saber and the pistol were the arms of the day as deadly hand
to hand combat covered the field.
Each side dueled on, no quarter asked, none given.
Commands became hopelessly mixed, battle lines were non-existent.
Finally it was force of numbers, not lack of fighting skill that
compelled Gregg to withdraw toward Brandy Station, abandoning Fleetwood
to its original occupants.
It was left to Lomax's 11th Virginia to make the assault which at last
permanently cleared the crest and captured Martin's guns.
As Gregg retired from the field, he must have wondered what had
happened to Duffie whose 2nd Division might have tipped the scales for
the Federals.
After leaving Gregg at the crossroads, Duffie had moved rapidly toward
Stevensburg. An advance
battalion sent to secure the town was pushed back by the head of
Butler's column, moving from Brandy Station pursuant to Stuart's orders.
Duffie concentrated his force near Hansborough Mountain.
Butler pursued and established a line across the Kelly’s
Ford-Stevensburg Road. A
preliminary, but timid, advance by Duffie was repulsed by the heavily
outnumbered Confederates.
Duffie then launched a massed assault which overran Butler's position,
forcing him to move to block the Brandy Station-Stevensburg Road.
The new Confederate line was near the Beckman house.
As Butler was preparing to make a stand there, a Federal solid
shot ricocheted off the road, cutting off his leg at the ankle before
passing through his horse, the horse of Stuart's aide W.D. Farley, and
finally mortally wounding Farley himself.
The Confederate position, hastily thrown up, was not strong and
the much heavier Federal force could have easily brushed it aside.
Just as Duffie was forming for the charge that would have carried
him to Brandy Station and Gregg's aid, he received the order from Gregg
directing him to return by the way he had come and then to follow
Gregg's route. Not
realizing that this order had been sent without an understanding of
Duffle's present position and that he could far better obey its intent
by pushing forward, Duffie broke off contact with Butler and Wickham and
withdrew out of the battle.
He did not rejoin Gregg until the latter had already pulled away from
Brandy Station en route, by a circuitous path, to unite with Buford's
left flank at the church line.
Buford and Pleasonton were just where Stuart had left them when he had
pulled Hampton and Jones back to Fleetwood.
The Federal commanders could not advance while the fight for the
hill raged because of the position of Rooney Lee on Buford's right
flank. To move forward
would have further exposed the Federal rear and the vital supply and
withdrawal line to Beverly Ford.
To attack Lee would have necessitated a northward march, away
from Gregg. Thus Pleasonton
did the best thing he could do; he stayed put, hoping that Gregg could
push Stuart back into Buford so that between the two Union forces, the
Confederates could have been crushed.
As Gregg joined Buford near the church, Stuart too brought his forces
back and the fighting resumed once more.
The Federals made the initial charge, utilizing both cavalry and
infantry. Although
successful at first, Buford was once again forced back by another strong
attack on his right by Rooney Lee.
In this assault, Lee was assisted by Munford's brigade which
finally reached the Confederate left after a confusing march caused by
ambiguous orders from Stuart's headquarters.
Lee and Munford were counter-attacked in turn and then the
fighting lapsed into a lull once more.
With a dispatch from Hooker in hand authorizing him to return to the
north bank of the Rappahannock if he felt he could not make headway,
just after 3:00 Pleasonton began an orderly withdrawal.
Buford and Ames forded at Beverly while the men of Gregg, Duffie,
and Russell crossed at the railroad bridge.
By 7:00 the Federals were gone and the Confederates made no
attempt to pursue or harass them.
Each side had had enough.
Last changed: 05/02/17
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