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In place of Volume 25, No. 5 – May 2012
Out of Thin Air -
The Story of Southern Logistics
A Presentation to the Civil War Round Table of Palm Beach County
It took me nine months to give birth to this talk tonight!
Not only did I need to cover a longer time period, but I found
that it was necessary to study many of the senior leaders of the
Confederacy. You will
remember that with northern supply I only discussed three people in any
depth. Here, dozens were
involved.
Like my last presentation, any meeting like this must of its very nature
fall under the category of “edutainment” rather than scholarly work.
I trust that the images, stories that illustrate my study, and a
downright breezy presentation will mask the fact that there was a fair
amount of research that went into this chat.
You cannot entertain by focusing in on statistics to make your
point. I am sure you all
are familiar with what Benjamin Disraeli said, and Mark Twain repeated,
about lies, damn lies, and statistics.
And while I must quote some numbers, I will not put you to sleep
with them.
After the cause was lost and the war had ended badly for the South, many
southern authors tried to address the question of why did the
Confederacy loose. The
ragged rebel, well led but poorly fed, seemed to explain away the many
of the facts. It is the
perfect image to southern apologists.
In this light you can argue that the individual rebel soldier or
leader was a much better fighter than any Yankee, or 10 Yanks.
The more ragged he appeared, and lacking in basic equipment, the
more glorious his victories and the easier to accept his defeats.
In fact the South had to build a modern 19th century
manufacturing economy out of thin air.
Without going into the economics of the planned economy, it
suffices to say that this would have been a herculean task in peace
time, let alone under the guns of war.
A brief history of the Soviet Union demonstrates how hard it is
to set up and run a centrally planned economy.
That they did successfully supply a large army and a home front
was to the credit of some amazing men.
Further, logistics is not sexy.
Most of the participants who did write history or memoirs wrote
about the glory of victory or the issues of dealing with the defeat at
arms. Few wrote about the
accounting
of war. While this is true
in general, it is even more to the point with the South in the Civil
War.
Finally, history is written by the winners some unknown sage once said.
Thus, there was much more material available to me then, when I
last addressed this august body.
The keystone of my argument will center around production and the story
of Josiah Gorgas. This man,
largely unknown, was arguably the most important reason the Confederacy
lasted as long as it did.
We will end this evening at “The End” of the Confederate States of
American. However, I would
direct you all to my brief essay that considers the “trick question” of
when did the Civil War end.
It is my contention that, if it ended at all, it was in the 1950s.
The whole raison d’etre for the Civil War Round Table is to
continue the discussion while ending the bloodshed.
Rebel Brass,
by Frank E. Vandiver
Confederate Industry,
by Harold S. Wilson
Ploughshares into Swords,
by Frank E. Vandiver
Gittin Stuff,
by Fred D. Seth
The South was an agrarian nation, so the one problem they should not
have had was feeding everyone including the army.
Northrop was a personal friend of Jefferson Davis so he had
access to the very highest level of command.
As we all know, Davis could not or would not delegate.
This meant that people who had a personal relationship with him
prospered.
Even if we make allowances for things beyond his control, like the sorry
state of the transportation system, Northrop was judged inadequate in
job performance.
Contemporaries called him “the most cussed and vilified man in the
Confederacy.” Between his
lack of abilities to work with subordinates and his perhaps “crony”
relationship with Davis, Northrop serves as the “poster boy” for the
South’s inability to pull together to support the war effort.
We will contrast Northrop with Josiah Gorgas in just a few minutes.
Gorgas illustrates how a person of great managerial skill, with
no real pipeline to Davis, could work miracles of supply.
Even though the South never resolved the basic issue of the
States’ control of the very means by which to wage war, Gorgas was able
to build a manufacturing base to supply the armies in the field.
Because of his success we will discuss the Ordnance Bureau in
much more detail.
Due to Davis’ military background he was fond of giving orders.
He had a tendency to “over command” instead of delegating.
Thus, many of the men surrounding the President were “yes men.”
It is no surprise that the first Secretary of War Leroy Pope
Walker failed for his only real qualification was his support of Davis.
Others, like the next man in this office, Judah P. Benjamin,
succeeded because he had the tact to “stoke” Davis and the brilliance to
execute his duties with skill.
The position of Secretary of War kept changing.
It would be an interesting exercise to compare and contrast
Lincoln’s problems with generals with Davis’ issues with the position of
Secretary of War. Benjamin
moved on to other positions, and George Randolph took over.
Randolph was a fairly competent guy, but was a “rubber stamp.”
There was an interim secretary for about a week before James A.
Seddon took over. We will
say more about him below.
The last man in this critical job was the general John C. Breckinridge.
By February of 1865 it was far too late for him to make a
difference, but hope, always a significant part of Confederate
life, never died until the end of hostilities… if even then.
In discussing leadership, a word must be said about the Congress.
Since the States had the real power, Congress tended to be
somewhat irrelevant. Here
were a group of guys sitting in isolation in Richmond trying to be
effective. In some cases,
they really could help. In
providing finances for continuing the war effort they had some success,
but in most issues they contributed little or made things worse.
Leaders of both houses distrusted the military.
Congress had no confidence in the Secretary of War who ever held
that position. And its fear
of the Secretary of the Treasury, for most of the war Christopher G.
Memminger, was serious.
Worst of all the President dictated to the Congress what it should do.
To add insult to injury, most of the time Davis was right.
Except for the end of the war the southern fighting man was fairly well
equipped with arms and ammunition.
This was the result of Ordnance.
Not only did this branch procure the material, it saw to it that
it was stored, maintained, and delivered to the troops in a timely
manner. Given the lack of
production and distribution in the South at the start of the war, this
was no small task. Of the
128,300 industrial establishments in the United States, 110,000 were
loyal to the Union.
Although time does not permit me to discuss his background tonight, the
story of how this man from Pennsylvania came to be the salvation of the
Confederacy is most interesting.
He was, both before the war and during it, like an eagle forced
to trot with the turkeys!
But, unlike Jefferson Davis, he got along famously with his
subordinates. He had just
enough “people skills” to get his way with his superiors.
The key to his success was his talent for organization and the
ability to change plans when a new problem arose.
He was firm when the South needed leadership and flexible when
his country need to change to adjust to new realities on the ground.
Although the Ordnance Bureau was narrowly defined to arms and
ammunition, as problems developed Gorgas jumped in and took charge
regardless of his having the authority to do so.
So, at different times he entered foreign affairs and created
contracts that had all of the earmarks of treaties with countries.
He needed ocean transport so he organized a fleet that look like
his private Navy. He ran
port operations as would an interior minister.
He need plants to make the arms and all types of equipment to
stock these factories.
Remember, 19th century machinery was powered by leather
belts, so Gorgas got involved with agriculture.
Now, unlike others in senior positions, Gorgas could do all this
because he had a tremendous capability to select quality subordinates
and to delegate the details to them.
Certainly, no one in the Confederacy did more to prolong the war,
except perhaps Robert E. Lee, than did Josiah Gorgas.
We will return to more of his exploits shortly.
He was not replaced, but General Lawton now outranked Colonel Myers such
that the Quartermaster was now Lawton.
Actually, forces in the ineffectual Congress continued to fight
the promotion into 1864, but he was in control from August 10th
until the end of the war.
There is no doubt that Lawton was a better administrator that was
Meyers, but he was no miracle worker.
After a census of resources he pressed for a uniform standard of
procurement and production.
Let me illustrate the grief that the Quartermaster had to contend with
using the story of Navy osnaburgs.
Osnaburgs is a rude linen fabric often used for lower class
clothing. Lawton’s census
had shown that the Navy had total control of a factory in South Carolina
making same. The plant had
the capacity for producing 50,000 yards per month, but the Navy only
needed 5,000 yards per quarter.
The remainder was left to the plant to sell on the open market at
a considerable profit. At a
time when the South needed fabric of all types, to have so much capacity
“leak out” was a crime particularly when we had a plant who's output was
owned by the Navy. What
Lawton did was to try to place the plant under Quartermaster control,
take all of the output, and deliver to the Navy what that service needed
each month. Slowly this
plan came to be implemented, but far too slowly to solve the supply
problem for the Quartermaster.
Once again we see the basic concept of a loose confederation of
states working at cross purposes with the war effort.
The history of warfare is replete with stories of commanders out running
their supplies. Longstreet
in the fall of 1863 is just one example.
With Braxton Bragg in the west and Lee in the east, Lawton had
his hands full trying to supply both armies.
The plan to reinforce Bragg with Longstreet was a good one and
part of that force helped win the day at Chickamauga.
But, instead of consolidating their forces in the west in
Chattanooga, Longstreet impetuously elected to march against Burnside at
Knoxville. With winter
setting in Longstreet was sitting at the end of a 1,000 mile, if I may
serve up a pun, “Long Street!”
There was no local supplies for this siege.
The army being besieged, Burnsides, was far better supplied than
Longstreet’s command doing the besieging.
Shoes and clothing ran low and scavenging for footgear produced
almost nothing in eastern Tennessee.
Like the Revolutionary War, once again soldiers left bloody
footprints in the snow.
Frequently rations were only raw corn normally used for animal fodder.
Now the blame game shifted into high gear.
Lawton did manage to ship some supplies to Longstreet, but
nowhere near enough.
Jefferson Davis called on Lawton for a full report.
Lawton blamed Lee for stripping the Richmond depot.
He said he expected imports to fill the need for shoes and
blankets, but these never came.
Most of these imports were interdicted off of the port of
Wilmington. Finally, Lawton
claimed that Longstreet’s requests were “of a more extravagant
character.” Lawton believed
that one third of the request would have been adequate.
At this critical time Gov. Zebulon Vance saved Longstreet’s bacon
by opening up state supplies.
During the winter Lee demanded the return of Longstreet.
One suspects Lee did this, not so much to relieve Longstreet’s
logistical problems, but to enhance the Army of Northern Virginia.
As we have already noted, the production and distribution capabilities
of the Confederacy were modest in the extreme.
Gorgas was one of the few far-sighted individuals who foresaw the
need to construct a manufacturing base sufficient to supply a long war.
Further, Gorgas was a master at delegating to achieve his goals.
As early as July 1861 he had selected George Washington Rains to
develop the capability to manufacture power.
Rains too was a genius at organization.
He quickly contracted with existing plants to get early supplies
flowing. For example the
Sycamore Powder Mill outside of Nashville contributed modest amounts of
saltpeter. Rains started
into enlarging the operation such that output was doubled to 1,500
pounds per day by October and doubled again to 3,000 pounds before
Nashville fell in February of 1862.
In Gorgas’ mind the issue of centralization vs. decentralization was
always churning. Early on
he recognized the efficiency of centralizing production in just a few
large plants. Three things
mitigated against this.
First, he early on recognized the inadequate railroad distribution
system. Next, he well
understood that in war, you cannot put all of your eggs in one basket.
The fall of Nashville noted above is a good illustration of the
wisdom of such reasoning. And
finally, getting labor, supplies of materials, and building large plants
was beyond the capabilities of the Confederacy.
Therefore, once he had at least one source of domestic supply he
went on to build up other manufacturing centers.
Often the first site was Richmond, VA and the second one was
somewhere in the deep south like Georgia.
Later on we will discuss the strengths and weaknesses of southern
factories.
Gorgas was on top of imports from Europe very early on in spite of the
fact that he did not have any official authority to conduct “foreign
affairs.” Early in 1861 he
recommend the government dispatch an agent to purchase foreign arms and
ammunitions. Major Caleb
Huse was his guy on the continent.
Supplied only with letters of credit on the English import-export
banking firm of Fraser, Trenholm, & Co. Huse, for all of his later
troubles, proved a great move for the new nation.
All of this got started with the ridiculous sum of £10,000.
Once contracts had been established, the arms had to transported.
Gorgas arranged slow sea passage to Bermuda or the Bahamas where
they were transshipped into his ordnance warehouses to await fast
transport on blockade-runners.
By early 1863 Gorgas received authority to manage sea
transportation for the government.
It was easy for the bickering officials in Richmond just to let
“Josiah do it.” De facto,
he became the logistics “general in chief.”
Things did not always go smoothly for him.
In a minute we will discuss the rise and fall of blockade
running, but he clearly was a man of action and he got things done.
The last point is the process of scavenging.
When you are in a supply deficit it is “gittin stuff” from the
enemy that is useful, as Nathan Bedford Forrest put it.
However the South was slow to pick up on this strategy.
Early in the war they had plenty and did not think the war would
last too long. Evidence of
this was the lack of policing the Bull Run battlefield. But, as it
became clear that stuff from the enemy was valuable, the South became
expert raiders. The Calvary
became particularly adept at this.
Ocean raiders did not bring much stuff home, but caused the price
of insurance to sky-rocket in the North to aid the war effort.
Scavenging meant also
taking what is needed from your own domestic supply.
As we will learn later critical metals were obtained by
cannibalizing finished goods.
And the citizens of the CSA were expected to chip in their
valuables such as food, clothing, and shelter for the war effort.
In this war, like no other before it, everyone was considered in
combat and on the front lines whether they liked it or not.
And the Confederate States of America was no “third world” banana
republic. It was the 4th
richest country in the world.
It had a well-supplied arsenal thanks to all of the Federal
installations within its borders.
And these “plums” had fallen like ripe fruit even before the
fighting got started. When
Virginia seceded in April 1861, the U.S. garrison attempted to burn the
arsenal at Harper’s Ferry and destroy the machinery, to prevent the
Confederates from using it.
However, locals saved the equipment, which the Confederate Army
transferred to a more secure location in its capital of Richmond.
Of particular note is the action of Secretary of War John Floyd who,
before the war even got started transferred tons of supplies either into
Southern instillations or
placed them in position where they could easily be seized.
Floyd was not the only one, but he certainly had the greatest
positive effect on Confederate logistics early on.
As mentioned above, the battle of Bull Run is a perfect example of smug
logistical thinking in Richmond.
When the tide had turned and Stonewall Jackson had his new name
the victors just stood there, like a stone wall.
Did they chase the “blue-bellies” down the road; they did not.
And so they let the Yankee’s pick up 175 wagon-loads of materials
dropped on the retreat.
Apparently no one in the capital thought that these supplies would come
in handy just a short time later.
Of course, someone in Washington did; it was Montgomery C. Meigs
who ordered a scavenging mission to collect up the spoils of war.
As I have suggested to you the ragged rebel is a myth and the South was
well equipped to fight a war.
As you all know the Confederacy did not have to win the war at
all; it just did not have to lose it.
Of course, all these things are clear in hindsight.
The urge to “whip those damn Yankees” was just too exciting a
prospect to ignore.
Secession underlined the fact that each state was in fact an independent
country. The Confederacy
was just that, a loose alliance to coordinate the war effort.
With that in mind it is not hard to understand why each state was
called upon to supply the troops from that state regardless of whether
this was possible or not.
While this happened in the North too, the “every state for itself”
attitude persisted much longer in the South.
After retreats in the spring of 1862 the Confederate Senate
requested a report of the extent of the material losses. James Pace was
dispatched to survey the textile mills of the South.
Although he received a warm reception in North Carolina, Governor
Vance maintained a vice grip on all state supplies.
Promises were made that the state would give over clothing to the
central authorities, and Myers back in Richmond counted on the states’
cooperation. However, this
proved a forlorn hope, as Vance refused to relinquish control.
Time and again Vance is the poster-boy for the lack of cooperation.
At a critical time in the war we have this letter from Lawton to
Vance, January 21, 1864.
“SIR: I am informed that the authorities of the State of North Carolina
hold a large quantity of woolen goods, party imported, beyond what can
possibly be needed for some time to come to meet the wants of the troops
from that State. As all the
manufacturing resources of the State have been devoted to the service of
the soldiers therefrom, and the State besides has enjoyed, through its
enterprise, unusual facilities for drawing supplies from abroad, it
occurs to me that there may be on hand excess of other necessary
articles, such as shoes and blankets, that be spared for a while to aid
the service at large the stress of the winter months.
At all events, I venture to bring the matter to your attention,
confident that your public spirit will lead you to do whatever you can
to aid the troops of the Confederacy.
Just at this time we are greatly in want of woolen goods and cloth
(heavy) of any description and blankets; shoes, too, would be
acceptable. The recent
heavy losses experienced by this department in connection with the
blockade has restricted somewhat its resources, and if you advance for a
while any of the supplies referred to they will be acceptable, and I
will come under an obligation to return the same early in the spring,
when the pressure now upon me shall in part have passed by.”
As I have mentioned earlier, Vance sometimes came to the rescue, but
more times than not, the states’ put their own need before the nation’s
need. This story repeated
itself time and time again with all classes of supply.
It was not like the logistics branches of the service did not try, and
Gorgas in ordnance did the best of all, but states’ rights was just too
popular to completely ignore.
In some sense, in the end, the states holding back meant that the
later concept of decentralization worked better.
But that is not the point.
People like Myers tried to centralize supply, at least the
management of same. As
early as the September of 1861, Myers had set up the Clothing Bureau to
manufacture and distribute clothing to all armies.
Even with the states holding back, in the period from August 1864
until the end of January 1865 the following issues were made: 104,199
jackets, 140,570 trousers, 167,862 shoes, 157,727 shirts, 170,139
drawers, 74,851 blankets, 27,011 hats, and 4,861 overcoats.
Not too shabby at the very end of the fight.
As the war dragged on supply chain issues and distribution became as
pressing as production; maybe more so.
One illustration will highlight this point:
Thirty carloads of uniform cloth sat on sidings in Charlotte,
North Carolina, and trains took two weeks to move thirteen boxes of
clothing and shoes from Florida to Dalton, GA according to the Richmond
Enquirer, November 28, 1862.
To make matters worse, both Union troops and local citizens, who
were suffering on the home front, looted unguarded trains.
It is doubtful that a policy of decentralization would have helped.
Although the South did not pursue a formal policy of
decentralization, except in the Ordnance Bureau, we find a lot of
evidence that they had de facto centers of production all throughout the
country. Like the
aforementioned stories about Vance, states’ maintained their local
production. As the war came
to a close it is surprising how many sites the Yankees were able to
torch while defeating Rebel armies.
Many in southern leadership positions had a hand in the running of the
blockade, but Gorgas lead the way because he alone wanted the goods bad
enough to act like his own Secretary of State.
At first blockade running was very successful with 3,465 ships,
or 96.8%, getting through in 1861.
Sadly, by 1862 the percentage was down to 66.2% and it stayed
that way for the remainder of the war.
Caleb Huse made many of the deals and Gorgas worked miracles
finding the funding; money always being in short supply.
Working together with Judah Benjamin in January 1862, they
managed to get 3 million dollars of Quartermaster funds transferred to
Ordnance for imports. I am
sure Myers was pleased about this!
When hard cash was not available, Gorgas made sure exports of
cotton were made available.
Many people are unaware that the blockade runners only operated near the
southern ports. This is
because these swift ships could hold only a limited amounts of cargo.
They also burned hard coal so as not to generate black smoke.
Ideally you wanted these greyhounds to make as many dashes into
port as they could. Thus,
Ordnance set up warehouses on British islands for transshipment to the
ultimate destination. The
quality of the imports was generally good to excellent.
After the capture of Vicksburg, General Grant thought so much of
the 60,000 muskets that fell into his command that he replaced the US
arms with Confederate.
There was a fair amount of graft and corruption involved with this
import business. It
bothered Gorgas, but not enough to let it hold back Huse.
Even after an investigation, Huse continued to be the
Confederate’s man in London.
Secretary Seddon wanted to recall Huse, but either respect for,
or fear of Gorgas, had so far restrained him.
Right from the start Ordnance had their own ships.
In July of 1863 they took command of the Collie Line.
Gorgas put his brother-in-law, Tom Bayne, in charge of running
the Bureau’s “merchant marine.”
And it ran, like all other divisions of Ordnance, efficiently and
effectively. Now, in this
shipping venture Gorgas had to share cargo space with the Quartermaster,
other Army organizations, and the Navy.
But it is clear that Ordnance got what it needed because it ran
the operation. If it were
not for the US Navy taking ships and the shortage of money, this import
program would have gone a long way to solve the Confederate logistics'
issues.
Delay was the biggest issue facing the import operation.
It took time to get funds to Europe, to collect up the cargo, to
ship same to the transshipment warehouses, to transfer the goods to the
swift blockade runners, and get the material safely into port.
Even in the “happy times” of 1861 the first arms shipment aboard
the Fingal took precious time.
The order for arms was placed in the spring but Fingal did
not make port until September 28, 1861.
Even when a cargo successfully reached port, their troubles were not
over. As we will discuss
next the railroads in the South were, to put it bluntly, a mess.
Even if this were not war-time and the country had desired to
focus on importation, physical distribution out of the ports would have
been a problem. With a
large and effective Navy, the Union could make landings along the coast
difficult and harass fixed installations at will.
The record is full of Confederate units being pulled from an army
to serve as coastal defense forces.
Part of the governor’s argument for withholding supplies was that
they were needed for state defense.
It took a bit of time for the North to get its act together, but once it
learned how to operate a blockade it became increasingly effective.
The first three novels of Robert Macomber’s “honor” series
explains in detail how this was accomplished.
One by one the Ordnance fleet was destroyed.
After 1862 only three ports remained open: Mobile, Charleston,
and Wilmington. This last
port stayed open until January of 1865, but by then logistics in the
South was pretty much over.
The rail system in the south could never measure up to the quality and
the quantity in the Union.
The Confederacy had very few railroads and once the war started, what
trackage they did have fell into decay.
This map shows that there were tracks of varying gauges which
meant that cargo from Montgomery to Raleigh had to be repacked four
times. To make
matters worse, the men who maintained the rail lines were sent to the
front leaving only a skeleton crew behind.
The system began to show evidence of disrepair as the first
battles were taking place in Virginia.
The railroads were maintained by hand, little machinery, few
supplies like lubricating oils, and all rails spiked by hand, so the
shortage of labor doomed this mode of transportation.
By an accident of geography, the waterways were badly placed for the
Confederacy. Even if they
held the Mississippi, which they did not, it ran north and south when
the need for river transportation was southwest to northeast.
Further, when rivers did flow in the right direction, like the
Tennessee, they were too shallow where they were needed most.
Finally, cargo river craft were easy targets for the inland river
Navy of the Union. With
3,500 miles of coastline, the ocean should have provided excellent water
transportation. However,
what vessels were available were devoted to blockade running and foreign
trade. Thus, the waterways
provided little aid to the cause.
The roadways both North and South, with a few exceptions, were not much
more than bridal paths. The
trouble Robert E. Lee complains about illustrates the problem with
roads: “Our greatest
difficulty is the roads. It has been raining in these
mountains about six weeks.
It is impossible to get along. It is that which has paralyzed all our
efforts.” Once the
war passed through an area, all bridges were destroyed.
And, like the issues with the railroads, there was not the labor
or materials on hand to do an adequate job of repair and maintenance.
In an early attempt at centralization, Myers established the Clothing
Bureau in May of 1861. Not
only did this organization serve as a distribution site, but it
manufactured clothing too.
Too often, however this government agency was in competition with the
private factories and states like North Carolina.
When the government needed cotton to finance the Crenshaw
steamship line, they had trouble securing large amounts of cotton to
send to Europe. One often
wondered if these operations were on the same side!
Let me give you one other example.
When the Federals gain temporary control of northern Alabama in
1862 they took over the cotton and wool manufacturing sites.
After the Yankees left the area to chase Bragg, the Confederate
Army regained control of the plants.
So what did CSA Quartermaster Major George W. Jones do with the
newly repatriated mills? He
impressed them. Imagine the
astonishment of the officers of the Clothing Bureau when Jones presented
them with 30,000 drawers and shirts made from his booty.
The shortage of labor plagued the South throughout the war.
The Conscription Acts provided for the Army but it disrupted the
production of vitally needed war supplies.
Factories could gain exemptions if they agreed to government
control, however, the uneven management of manufacturing proved to be
too much for the Confederacy.
Even today, the planned economy is impossible for governments to
managed.
Even before conscription, the rush of volunteers to the Army left many
plants with critical skill shortages.
For example, after Fort Sumter the Cedar Falls textile mill stood
quiet so the workers could send off to the front the Randolph Hornets
in style. The next day
the plant suffered production losses as skilled workers had left to join
the fight. The first
Conscription Act acerbated the problem.
The Exemption Act of October 1862 tried to place limits on the
drafting of men with critical skills.
It failed to stem the bleeding as military commanders and
recruiters just ignored the Act.
The various Secretaries of War did nothing to discourage this
behavior. As the war
dragged on, even the non-skilled positions felt the drain from the armed
forces. Not even the
employment of black slaves solved the problem of factory labor and made
the problem of agricultural labor worse.
Here is a good example of the problem.
Superintendent of Railroads William Wadley reported he could do
nothing to improve the failing transportation network, since so many of
his mechanics had been conscripted by the army.
General Lee fought to retain Wadley’s mechanics, which
coincidently impacted Lee’s own supply support.
When you try to control a modern economy you first address the obvious
needs like labor. What you
fail to address is the second and third order needs.
For example you are trying to make clothing but you run short of
oil. Oil?
How does oil fit into the manufacturing of say blankets?
Power looms need lubrication and fine whale oil was no longer
available. Lard was tried,
but it proved to be a poor substitution.
Tools and machinery proved to be an even bigger problem for the
South than food, clothing, or labor.
In order to build and run a modern manufacturing system the South needed
financing. The seizure of
US mints and property provided scant hard currency.
The belief that the South would win developed a good deal foreign
credit. This allowed for
the national debt to swell to $700 million backed by $27 million in
specie. However, after the
loss of Vicksburg the jig was up and foreigners turned off the credit
tap. This caused the
run-away inflation which soared to 6,000%.
It was a miracle that the Confederacy lasted much beyond the
summer of 1863.
As I have already said, when the war began the South had almost no
capability to manufacture gunpowder.
There were 4 small powder mills, two in Tennessee and two in
South Carolina. Gorgas
tapped George Washington Rains to create this vital resource.
The first step, as I have already explained, was to greatly
enlarge the operation in Nashville.
Rains also secured the means to produce saltpeter.
From the humble beginnings in Nashville, Rains established a
number of powder mills throughout the South.
The major facility in Augusta, GA was built from the ground up as
a modern production site.
The fact that Rains could conceive of, plan for, build, and have the
facility operational by April 1862 was astonishing.
Gorgas found 1st Lieutenant John W. Mallet on the staff of General
Robert Rodes. Mallet was a
chemist and was just the man Gorgas needed to head the Ordnance Labs and
oversee the production of ammunition.
The first thing Mallet was asked to do was to survey the
ammunition. This was not
easy for this mild-mannered scholar.
But Mallet was an outstanding scientist, leader, and manager.
His report stress standardization of ordnance and the
centralization of production.
This document became the blueprint that Gorgas used to
successfully manage the arms of the Confederacy.
It also gave him the reasons for gaining partial control of the
railroads, iron production, and a great number of other southern
enterprises. Although
centralization would be compromised out of necessity, Mallet’s plans, as
executed by Gorgas, was the main reason the South held out so long.
The next two examples illustrate first how Gorgas could build
industries out of thin air and second how he could be very flexible when
the war took its toll on his industrial engine.
Behind the production of a southern made pistol was yet again one of
Gorgas’ superstars. This
time it was James H. Burton.
Burton had spent some time with the British firm that made the
Enfield rifle. He was put
in charge of building a new armory at Macon, GA.
One of his pet projects was to produce a pistol at the startup
firm of Spiller & Burr.
Burton based his design for 15,000 pistols on the Whitney revolver, an
updated design of Eli Whitney’s original pistol.
Many of the machines needed to make the firearms came from the
captured equipment from Harper’s Ferry.
By December 1862 the plant in Atlanta shipped its first pistol.
Although the troops had issues with this homegrown item, the fact
that they could produce it at all was nothing short of a miracle. 1,451
of these pistols were produced and they are prized by collectors today.
Later on, when Sherman threatened the Spiller & Burr plant in
Atlanta, the entire production floor was moved to the Macon Arsenal.
The problems that Gorgas had with shortages as the war was going badly
for the South gives you some insight into the man’s flexible thinking.
Sometime shortly after the battle of Chattanooga the Ducktown
copper mines fell into the hands of the Yankees.
This was a terrible loss as 90% of the needed copper came from
there. Until the mines were
lost, copper did not seem like a very critical item.
However, all muzzle loading artillery pieces used a small copper
tube filled with ignition powder and fulminate of mercury to set off the
gun. No copper, no
artillery!
Mallet tried to use a paper friction primer, but this was not very
successful. Blockade
running brought in a little copper, but nothing like the needed amount.
To make up for this deficiency the Ordnance Bureau impressed
turpentine and apple brandy stills in North Carolina.
They got enough copper coils for the last two years of the war.
Until the fall of Atlanta, only bits and pieces of supply was removed
from the system. The story
of copper is a good example.
But once Atlanta was no longer in southern hands large chunks of
the production distribution capability were lost.
Not only were the factories gone, but the hub and spoke plan of
the rail lines was shattered along with the stores in rail cars and
warehouses. To make Gorgas’
problems worse, when Hood evacuates he goes, not southeast, but west!
Georgia’s governor Brown will not release arms to Hood.
Bills were not being paid so even if the Ordnance wanted to buy from
private armories they could not.
Not even the agriculturally focused South could feed the men
under arms and the population in general.
Some of this problem was not enough crops, but the bulk of the
issue was the lack of transportation.
It seemed like Gorgas was playing a game of “whack-a-mole.”
As soon as he got one area under control another one went
critical. His plan of
decentralization helped a little, but the war was clearly winding down.
The coup de grace was financial.
Inflation finally overwhelmed the Confederacy.
In some of the plants being run by Ordnance and manned by slaves,
they could not even buy food with the worthless money and the lack of
transportation. They tried
to send stores and machinery to a safe location, but the one they
picked, Savannah, turned out to be a horrible site.
Sherman feasted on the carcass of Gorgas’ logistical base.
At the end Gorgas was in Danville trying to make provisions for
the expected arrival of the government and the army with General Lee.
Neither group made it so Gorgas heard about Appomattox while
still in Danville.
The fact that the Confederate States of America lasted almost two years
longer than it had any right to, was in the main due to the genius of
Josiah Gorgas.
Last changed: 05/08/12 |
Doubting
I could do the job to the degree of expertise required to stand up in
front of this august body, I procrastinated almost a year before even
starting to look for material.
In
a manner similar to Bob’s Question last time this presentation has a
central theme.
It
was not easy to put together this presentation.
We
have already covered the introduction.
The
gentleman standing before you is not a professional historian and most
of you in the audience know far more about the civil war than I do.
Before
getting into the “meat” of this evening’s material I must explain that
this is not original work.
We
will not discuss the topics shown on this slide in the strict order
presented on same.
The
Commissary is an excellent place to begin as it illustrates the issues
of the chain of command.
The
second major branch of supply was Ordnance.
The
last branch we will introduce is Quartermaster.
The
Confederacy was slow to see the logistical prospects before her.
Much
of the early optimism about the “Second American Revolution”
So,
it is clear that the South was not thinking about a logistical strategy
early on in the war.
As
we already discussed, blockade running was the key to a successful “buy”
strategy.
A
key element of logistics is distribution.
At
this point I should remind you once again that we keep visiting and
revisiting the same topics.
How
the Confederacy did make it to April 1865 is largely due to our friend
Josiah Gorges.
The
war probably should have ended soon after the retreat from Gettysburg
when it became clear that the North was not going to give up and let the
Confederacy “be.”